Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), including information on criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and kidnapping; state response to criminal activity (2009 - February 2011)
|Publisher||Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada|
|Publication Date||5 April 2011|
|Citation / Document Symbol||COL103709.E|
|Cite as||Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), including information on criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and kidnapping; state response to criminal activity (2009 - February 2011), 5 April 2011, COL103709.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dbfcc952.html [accessed 23 May 2013]|
|Disclaimer||This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.|
In a report on the findings of a delegation to Colombia by the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), "a non-profit umbrella organization committed to the rights and protection of refugees in Canada and around the world" (CCR n.d.), a political counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Bogotá states that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and other guerrillas have been "hit hard" and "contained" by the Colombian government, "but that they still have about 8,000-10,000 members" (CCR Mar. 2011, 6). Similarly, Agence France-Press (AFP) notes that FARC numbers are between 7,000 and 11,000 members (8 Jan. 2011).
Under the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Public Safety Canada website publishes a list of entities that are identified "as being associated with terrorism" (Canada 11 Sept. 2008). The list that was reviewed on 22 December 2010 includes the FARC (ibid. 1 Feb. 2011).
Strength of FARC's command and control structure
The Foundation Ideas for Peace (Fundación Ideas para la paz, FIP), an independent Colombian think-tank dedicated to building a sustainable peace in Colombia (FIP n.d.), suggests that pressure from Colombia's Public Force (Fuerza Pública) has [translation] "weakened" the FARC's "military structure" (Sept. 2010, 23). Two academics, one based at the National University of Colombia (Universidad Nacional de Colombia) and the other at the London School of Economics, writing in the journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism following research conducted in 2009, similarly indicate that
under the weight of the state offensive, the organizational structure has loosened, because: (a) The group's communication system was intercepted; (b) it lost several key cadres, and the information they held; (c) several structures were disarticulated (Sanín and Giustozzi 2010, 836, 843)
However, the International Crisis Group, a non-governmental organization (NGO) "committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict" (n.d.), points out in a 2010 policy briefing that despite Colombia's "eight-year military campaign" against FARC, the group's "command and control structure has not collapsed" (International Crisis Group 29 June 2010, 1). A Review of International Studies article by Jim Rochlin, a political science professor and director of Latin American Studies at the University of British Colombia, further stresses that "even if [the group's] command and control [had] been debilitated, the group is so dispersed and so militarily potent that it has the capacity to exert punishing military force for years to come" (Rochlin Aug. 2010, 715, 739). This idea is also expressed by the two academics, Francisco Guitiérrez Sanín and Antonio Giustozzi, in their Studies in Conflict & Terrorism article (2010, 836). They note that despite the "heavy blows" brandished by the government, the FARC's "organizational structure is far from being dismantled or irreparably crippled; it can exhibit -- almost on a daily basis -- its combat capacity, and has strong defensive skills" (Sanín and Giustozzi 2010, 841).
FARC organizational structure
According to Sanín and Giustozzi, the FARC's current structure is the same as the structure established in 1982, except for "minor changes" (2010, 842). The academics explain that the group's structure is centralized to an "extremely high" degree and describe its composition as follows:
Its basic military unit is the column, composed of 20 to 40 fighters; it is an operational unit in charge of the control of a certain territory, of collecting taxes and rackets and of military actions. A plurality of columns makes up a Front. The Fronts sometimes congregate in Blocks. Front and Block commanders respond directly -- both militarily and financially -- to the Secretariat, which operationally is the supreme direction of the group. (Sanín and Giustozzi 2010, 842-843)
The academics add that the Secretariat "establishes the percentage of income it will receive," as well as how money will be redistributed between fronts (ibid., 846). Along the same lines, a report on the demobilization of FARC by the FIP describes the group's structure as [translation] "the periphery maintaining the centre: the fronts submit their income to the Secretariat, which used to be the centre of redistribution for the 'poor' fronts (today every one must ensure their own survival and pay tribute [to the Secretariat] at the same time)" (FIP Sept. 2010, 9). According to an article in The Economist, the Secretariat consists of seven members (30 Sept. 2010).
FIP also explains that the commanders of the fronts are middle managers (mandos medios); because they are usually from the same region the unit occupies, they have the strategic advantage of knowing both the [translation] "territory and population" (FIP Sept. 2010, 9). They are also [translation] "the ones that regulate the life and social relations of the troops," work with the population, and "assure the finances of the organization" (ibid. Sept. 2010, 9).
InSight, a think-tank with offices in Colombia and Washington specializing in research on organized crime in the Americas (InSight 15 Mar. 2011), reports that FARC has militia groups in the cities and special forces units that operate where "most needed;" the group also has a "vast support network full of logistical experts in bombing, transportation, kidnapping, arms trafficking, food storage, etc." (ibid. 1 Mar. 2011).
The FARC fronts
The International Crisis Group concluded that, in 2010, FARC's estimated 8,000 to 10,000 members were organized into 61 fronts, of which only 30 were assumed active (29 June 2010, 2). The Crisis Group also mentions that the FARC includes "a mobile structure consisting of an estimated fifteen to sixteen mobile columns (columnas moviles) and around thirteen smaller companies (compañias)" (29 June 2010, 2). Reporting in 2011, InSight writes that FARC has more than 70 fronts (1 Mar. 2011). In November and December 2010, InSight also identified where 26 fronts and other units are located using an interactive map; the information can be accessed on the InSight website (InSight n.d.).
The report by FIP also lists the location and name of several of the FARC fronts, as follows [translation]:
- Front 10 operates in the department of Arauca, bordering Venezuela. This structure is one of the most involved in drug trafficking.
- Front 38, which operates in the departments of Boyacá and Casanare.
- Front 39, which operates on the border of the departments of Meta and Vichada. It is one of the structures most hit by the paramilitary groups operating in the region.
- Front 43 operates in Meta and its commander's alias is 'John 40.' This structure is also one of the ones most compromised by drug trafficking.
- Front 44 operates in the department of Meta and is considered one of the strongest military structures in the Eastern Bloc. (FIP Sept. 2010, 15)
In addition, the Colombian NGO Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (CNAI) reports that, according to Colombian military authorities, the FARC created a new front, Front 81 in the department of Guavire, out of Front 1, which had a presence in the Amazonas department (CNAI July 2009, 25).
FIP also identifies which fronts make up which different blocks:
- The Eastern Block includes fronts 16, 26, 39 and 44; [translation] "its fronts are present in nine departments in southeastern Colombia";
- The South Block includes Front 32;
- The Martín Caballero Bloc, previously known as the Caribbean Block, includes fronts 19 and 35;
- The José María Córdoba Bloc includes fronts 9, 47, and 57;
- The Central Joint Command (Comando Conjunto Central) includes fronts 21 and 50; and
- The Western Joint Command (Comando Conjunto de Occidente) includes the Daniel Aldana Mobile Column and the Manuel Cepeda Urban Front (FIP Sept. 2010, 15, 18).
In addition, Bogotá-based El Espectador reports military authorities as saying that the Central Block of the FARC is made up of 11 groups (19 July 2010).
The FIP report also describes FARC's Eastern Block as having [translation] "the highest number of men, the best arms capacity, a strong influence on the population and the most involvement in drug trafficking" (Sept. 2010, 15).
Change in military strategy
During its fact-finding mission in Colombia, the CCR interviewed several people who noted that, as a result of the Colombia army offensive against the guerrillas, FARC changed its attack strategy, returning to the "'guerrilla tactics'" of "attack and disappear" rather than "acting as a regular army" (Mar. 2011, 10). The International Crisis Group also points out that in an attempt to "adapt to the changing and ever more hostile security environment, FARC is relying increasingly on guerrilla warfare tactics" (29 June 2010, 3). Academics Sanín and Giustozzi corroborate this idea by noting that FARC has started to fight "with smaller units and [are] rediscovering the advantages of mobility and waiting tactics" (2010, 841). Evidence of this change is also noted by a representative of the National Ombudsman's Office in Colombia (CCR Mar. 2011, 10-11). He told the CCR that FARC is working in smaller groups of up to 10 people instead of the hundreds- or thousands-strong blocs of earlier days, to allow for "'faster mobility'" (ibid.).
A study in Arcanos, a magazine published by CNAI (CNAI 26 May 2008), also notes that FARC has adopted new combat strategies, including [translation] "professionalizing its troops" increasing sniper and explosive activities, and decreasing face-to-face combat (ibid. Apr. 2010, 17). Sanín and Giustozzi point out that "to adapt to [its] new conditions, the FARC has created more special units in each Front (e.g., of snipers)" (2010, 843). Another way FARC is "adapting to military pressure," notes the International Crisis Group, is through "aggressive recruitment among rural populations [and] broadened involvement in drug trafficking" (29 June 2010, 1).
Both the Canadian embassy's political counsellor and the representative of the Colombian Ombudsman's Office indicated, in their interviews with the CCR, that FARC has had to ally itself with other groups, including "former enemies" (CCR Mar. 2011, 11). The International Crisis Group also notes that FARC is making "alliances with other armed groups and drug trafficking organisations" (29 June 2010, 1).
Several examples of FARC's alliances with guerrilla groups, drug traffickers and paramilitaries have been documented by the National Prosecutor's Office of Colombia (Fiscalía General de la Nacíon) and subsequently reported by Bogotá-based Caracol Radio (Caracol Radio 4 May 2010). In the department of Norte de Santander, for example, these include a partnership between the FARC's "Resistencia Barí" front and the National Liberation Army's (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) "Libardo Mora Toro" front to control the production of coca in the Catatumbo-Barí National Park, as well as routes to Venezuela (ibid.). In Colombia's Eastern Plains (Llanos Orientales), FARC is linked with the criminal groups the People's Anti-communist Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario Popular Anticomunista, ERPAC) and Los Rastrojos (ibid.). FARC fronts 18 and 58 have also been linked to the emerging criminal bands (bandas emergentes) Los Urabeños, the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras), Los Paisas, and Los Rastrojos; the FARC fronts are apparently trading the production of the coca base for firearms and food with these groups (ibid.). As well, in the Valle del Cauca, there are links between FARC and the drug-trafficking organization "'Clan González Rivas'," which is active along the Pacific Coast, especially in neighbouring Chocó department and the city of Buenaventura (Caracol Radio 4 May 2010).
According to political science professor Jim Rochlin, FARC endured "[s]erious blows" in 2008, losing three key leaders (Aug. 2010, 738). The second in command, Raúl Reyes, was killed in Ecuador by a combined Colombian-United States (US) force; the "ultimate leader," Manuel Marulanda, died of natural causes; and a member of the Secretariat, Ivan Rios, was killed by his bodyguard in exchange for money from the government (Rochlin Aug. 2010, 738). Freedom House corroborates the deaths of the three men in its Freedom in the World Report 2010 (2010).
More recently, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted the death on 20 September 2010 of "Mono Jojoy," second in the FARC's "collective leadership" and "its most important military commander" (Oct. 2010, 5). Mono Jojoy was reportedly in charge of the FARC's Eastern Block, which, according to CSIS, consists of one half of the FARC's armed forces (Oct. 2010, 5). In reporting on Jojoy's death, media sources described the Eastern Bloc as the FARC's "strongest" unit (Time International 10 Nov. 2010; Christian Science Monitor 23 Sept. 2010), with "an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 fighters" (ibid.). The strategic importance of Jojoy's death to the Colombian government is noted in a Time International Time International article (10 Nov. 2010). Calling it "'probably the strongest and most important strike'" made against FARC (Time International 10 Nov. 2010), President Santos described the death of Mono Jojoy as the "'beginning of the end'" for FARC (The Economist 30 Sept. 2010; Miami Herald 29 Oct. 2010).
However, El Espectador reports that "'Alfonso Cano'," FARC's leader since the death in May 2008 of Manuel Marulanda, remains at large, hidden in southeastern Colombia and protected by FARC's Central Block (19 July 2010). In 2011, Colombian news source CaracolTV.com reported the death of Cano's chief of security, who was also one of the heads of FARC's Central Joint Command (CaracolTV.com 21 Mar. 2011). Still, in spite of "the death of many members of the FARC secretariat," the Canadian embassy's political counsellor, speaking to the CCR delegation in Colombia, opined that FARC guerrillas "still have the capacity to make a resurgence" (CCR Mar. 2011, 11).
According to political science professor Jim Rochlin, "there is no question that the Farc's mobility and communication system have been weakened" by government efforts against the FARC (Aug. 2010, 732). Academics Sanín and Giustozzi also point out that FARC's "communications have been disorganized" (2010, 841). Further corroboration is provided through the interviews conducted by the CCR delegation in Colombia, which indicate that the Colombian Army has weakened FARC's communication system (Mar. 2011, 13). Similarly, International Crisis Group research in Bogotá, Antioquia, Nariño, Chocó, Norte de Santander, Meta and Sucre also points out that FARC is "experiencing serious coordination and communication problems" (29 June 2010, 2).
On a different note, a representative from Colombia's National Ombudsman's Office indicates that guerrillas such as FARC have networks of informants controlling "'complete neighbourhoods and cities'" (CCR Mar. 2011, 17). The CCR explains that these informants are inside of "many entities which have contact" with civilians, including internally displaced people, seeking to avoid threats from "armed actors" (CCR Mar. 2011, 16, 17).
In a public message released on 7 January 2011, details of which are related by the Latin American Weekly Report, FARC leader Alfonso Cano promised that in 2011 FARC would "'redouble activities in every sense'" (Latinnews.com 13 Jan. 2011). Several sources describe the types of activities in which FARC is or has been involved (FIP Sept. 2010, 9; Sanín and Giustozzi 2010, 846; El Espectador 11 Mar. 2011; Semana.com 29 Jan. 2011). The FIP report, for example, indicates that among other illegal activities, FARC is involved in the drug trade and extortion (FIP Sept. 2010, 9).
Academics Sanín and Giustozzi also note that FARC is involved with the legal economy through extortion; as example they report the "contributions" provided by rural elites in territories in which FARC has established "long-term" control (2010, 846). A different example of extortion is mentioned in a Semana.com article that details how members of FARC extort people, such as common businessmen, for ammunition (29 Jan. 2011). The commander of the Colombian Armed Forces indicates, in an El Espectador article, that the number and name of companies that [translation] "'continue to feed terrorism in Colombia'" through extortion by illegal armed groups such as FARC is unknown to them (11 Mar. 2011).
A variety of FARC activities are also mentioned in Rochlin's journal article (Aug. 2010, 735). Referring to a 2008 interview with a "high-placed member" of FARC's International Commission, Rochlin reports that only a "'tiny'" percentage of FARC's funding is based on drug trafficking, and that "more significant" is its investments in domestic and international "'high finance'," agriculture, mining, raising cattle, transportation, construction and other types of investments (Aug. 2010, 735). An example of this is provided by The Economist, which reports that FARC is financing its operations through illegal gold mines (27 Jan. 2011). Police evidence reportedly points to the existence of 15 such mines in the department of Bolívar that FARC is either mining themselves or extorting payments from other, "mainly illegal" miners (The Economist 27 Jan. 2011).
Human rights abuses
Freedom House reports that in 2009, FARC, as well as others, performed "several massacres of members of the [indigenous] Awa group" (2010). This is corroborated by the International Crisis Group, which mentions two Awá massacres in February 2009 by FARC, as well as another in August of the same year that appears to have also been perpetrated by FARC (29 June 2010, 6). These incidents were followed by "massive displacements" (International Crisis Group 29 June 2010, 6).
According to a report by the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), FARC is among the groups responsible for "continuing homicides, threats, attacks, information theft, illegal surveillance and intimidation targeting human rights defenders and their organizations in different parts of the country" (UN 3 Feb. 2011, para. 10). The report further attributes "disappearances, confinement, forced displacement indiscriminate attacks through the use of anti-personnel mines" and "acts of sexual violence" to FARC (ibid., para. 70).
According to academics Sanín and Giustozzi, FARC's involvement in "the coca business" is "very strong" and "credible" evidence suggests the guerrillas have been "actively engaging in the protection of crops, the processing of the product, and its exportation" since the 1990s (2010, 846). This is further corroborated by Rochlin, who notes that a number of factors suggest the group's "significant participation in narcotrafficking," including its "clear control over areas of [coca] cultivation, its political representation of coca growers, together with its admission of involvement in this illicit and highly profitable industry" (Aug. 2010, 735). Similarly, the CCR reports the Canadian embassy's political counsellor as indicating that FARC "is becoming more and more of a drug trafficking organization, and that they sustain themselves in this way, although they remain ideological" (Mar. 2011, 11). The International Crisis Group also mention's FARC's involvement in drug trafficking through Panama, Venezuela and Brazil, as well as along the Pacific (29 June 2010, 7).
The 2010 World Drug Report by the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), implicates Front 48, which is "situated along the border with Ecuador," as specifically involved in drug trafficking, as it is "central" to FARC's "cocaine trafficking operations" (UN 2010, 234). In the Caracol Radio article, FARC's southern and eastern blocks are said to be greatly involved in drug trafficking (4 May 2010). The same article indicates that not only is Front 15 [translation] "the main producer of alkaloids" (which is extracted from coca leaves to produce cocaine [Brombacher and Maihold Sept. 2009, 8]), it also works with other drug traffickers in the southern departments of the country (Caracol Radio 4 May 2010). Caracol Radio also reports that, according to the Prosecutor's Office, Front 29 and the Daniel Aldana Mobile Column cultivate and transport cocaine to the coastal towns of the Nariño department (ibid.). The International Crisis Group mentions eight fronts as being almost exclusively involved in drug trafficking: Front 30 in Cauca Valley, Front 29 in Nariño, Front 63 in Caquetá, Front 15 in Amazonas, Front 48 in Putumayo, front 6 and 60 in Cauca, Front 57 in Chocó, and Front 33 in Norte de Santander (29 June 2010, 8).
Both the US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 and an Amnesty International (AI) public statement calling for the release of all hostages indicate that guerrilla groups such as FARC are responsible for large numbers of kidnappings (US 11 Mar. 2010, Sec. 1g; AI 10 Feb. 2011). The US report notes that FARC uses politicians and members of security forces as hostages in negotiations with the government (11 Mar. 2011, Sec. 1g). However, AI mentions that there has been a decline in kidnappings over the years and notes the release of a local councillor by FARC on 9 February 2011 after being held for 19 months (10 Feb. 2011). On a related note, the Guardian reported the release of two politicians and two military officers in February 2011 (Guardian 17 Feb. 2011). The same article also mentions that although FARC "freed 6 hostages in the past week," the guerrillas are still holding 15 army and police officers (ibid.). El Espectador reports the mass kidnapping of 23 contractors from the encampment of an oil company by FARC's front 16 (9 Mar. 2011).
An analysis of FARC military activities in 2009 by the CNAI indicates that FARC continues to have a [translation] "strong military capacity, which is demonstrated by its actions in La Guajira, Guaviare, Cauca and Nariño," as well as its success in recapturing certain lost territories (CNAI Apr. 2010, 5). The study also notes that compared to 2008, FARC's military activity increased by 27 percent in 2009 (ibid., 8). In actual numbers, this amounts to 1,614 military actions in 2009, of which there were 421 minefield activities, 181 sniper attacks, 55 ambushes, 93 attacks on the energy infrastructure, 612 fighting, 168 harassments, and 84 others (ibid., 10). There has also been an increase of FARC military activity in the departments of Arauca, Guaviare, Putumayo and Nariño (ibid., 15).
State response to FARC
The International Crisis Group, in an October 2010 report on Colombia's internal conflict, reports that former President Alvaro Uribe had pursued a "predominantly military approach" to ending "Colombia's generations of armed conflict" (13 Oct. 2010, i). As a result, the military has re-established security along most main roads in the country, increased the presence of police in most municipalities and, as has been mentioned throughout, weakened the FARC (13 Oct. 2010, 1). A similar view is presented in the CCR report by the Canadian embassy's political counsellor who notes that "urban security has improved dramatically in the last eight years" (Mar. 2011, 6). However, the counsellor cautions that
the worst of the conflict had been 'pushed outward,' to the external regions of the country, where there is a strong impact on civilians. The Colombian government is not 100% successful yet, but it is a 'work in progress'. (CCR Mar. 2011, 6)
The International Crisis Group also notes that the state has "regained control of considerable parts of national territory" however, it reports that FARC continues to replace those members that have been "killed, captured or defected" through voluntary and forced recruitment (13 Oct. 2010, 1-2). As well, those interviewed by the CCR delegation point out that FARC's "'new styles of military operation'" also mean that FARC guerrillas do not need to maintain a presence in cities because they can "hire 'killers for pay' (sicariossicarios) to undertake a military action in any city of Colombia" (CCR Mar. 2011, 11). The representative from the National Ombudsman's Office further notes that FARC "can attack 'in any place, and they do not need big groups'" (ibid., 12).
The Colombian Ministry of Defence provides statistics showing the success of its voluntary demobilization program for guerrillas and paramilitaries in operation since 2002; the numbers for FARC show that 2,128 individuals voluntarily demobilized in 2009, 2,009 for 2010, and 339 for 1 January to 7 March 2011 (Colombia n.d.). However, the International Crisis Group concedes that while government efforts have "facilitated demobilisation of combatants," it has not been as successful in "generating opportunities to insert them into the work force," creating a situation in which it is possible to "lure" ex-combatants back into "illegality" (13 Oct. 2010, 10).
An example of the government's continuing pursuit of FARC is provided in a July 2010 El Espectador article, in which a Colombian army general discusses the capture of 280 men and the seizure of important administrative and communication information from FARC's Central Block (19 July 2010). As well, authorities reported that 12 members of FARC leader Alfonso Cano's personal security team were killed in a military attack on 11 July 2010, and that Cano's [translation] "personal confidante" was captured in a separate operation (El Espectador 19 July 2010).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Agence France-Presse (AFP). 8 January 2011. "Colombia Rebel Attack Leaves Nine Dead." (UN ReliefWeb)
Amnesty International (AI). 10 February 2011. "Colombia: Guerrilla Groups Must Release All Hostages." (AMR 23/001/2011)
Brombacher, Daniel, and Günther Maihold. September 2009. Cocaine Trafficking to Europe: Options of Supply Control. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper.
Canada. 1 February 2011 (reviewed 22 December 2010). Public Safety Canada (PSC). "Currently Listed Entities."
_____. 11 September 2008. Public Safety Canada (PSC). "Listed Entities."
Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). March 2011. Francisco Rico-Martinez. The Future of Colombian Refugees in Canada: Are We Being Equitable? Report of the Canadian Council for Refugees Delegation to Panama and Ecuador (jointly with the Refugee Council USA) and to Colombia in November 2010.
_____. N.d. "About the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR)."
Caracol Radio [Bogotá]. 4 May 2010. Ricardo Ospina. "Así funcionaría la estructura del narcotráfico de las Farc."
CaracolTV.com [Bogotá]. 21 March 2011. "Confirmado: murió alias 'Jerónimo,' derecha de 'Alfonso Cano'."
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). October 2010. Phillip McLean. "Colombia." Hemisphere Highlights. Vol. 9, No. 7.
The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 23 September 2010. Sibylla Brodzinsky. "Colombia Troops Kill Top FARC Rebel Leader 'Mono Jojoy'." (EBSCOhost)
Colombia. N.d. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. "Estadísticas: Programa de Atencíon Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PHAD)."
Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (CNAI). April 2010. Ariel Fernando Ávila Martínez. "La guerra contra las FARC y la guerra de las FARC." Arcanos. No. 15.
_____. July 2009. Tomándole el pulso al conflicto armado: balance del primer semestre de 2009. No. 1.
_____. 26 May 2008. "Quienes somos."
The Economist [New York]. 27 January 2011. "Security in Colombia. Guerrilla Miners: The FARC Turn to Gold."
_____. 30 September 2010. "Security in Colombia. The Beginning of the End: Demise of the FARC's Top Killer"
El Espectador El Espectador [Bogotá]. 11 March 2011. "No sabemos cuántas empresas están pagando extorsiones: FF.MM."
_____. 9 March 2011. "Investigan infiltración de las Farc en secuestro de trabajadores de petrolera."
_____. 19 July 2010. "Once estructuras de las Farc custodian a 'Alfonso Cano'."
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Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP). September 2010. Gerson Iván Arias, Natalia Herrera, and Carlos Andrés Prieto. Mandos medios de las FARC y su proceso de desmovilización en el conflicto colombiano: ¿Una apuesta para la paz o para la guerra? Serie Informes No. 10. <<http://www.ideaspaz.org/portal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=47&Itemid=55> [Accessed 8 Mar. 2011]
_____. N.d. "About Us." <<http://www.ideaspaz.org/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=646%3Aabout-us&catid=1%3Alatest-news&Itemid=122> [Accessed 28 Mar. 2011]
Guardian [London]. 17 February 2011. "Colombian Rebels Free Two More Hostages."
InSight. 15 March 2011. "About InSight - Organized Crime."
_____. 1 March 2011. "FARC."
_____. N.d. "FARC Areas of Influence."
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_____. 29 June 2010. Improving Security Policy in Colombia. Policy Briefing - Latin America Briefing No. 23.
_____. N.d. "About Crisis Group."
Latinnews.com. 13 January 2011. "Farc Throws Down the Gauntlet for 2011." Latin American Weekly Report. <<http://www.latinnews.com/lwr/LWR22530.asp?instance=12&search=farc> [Accessed 17 Mar. 2011]
Miami Herald. 29 October 2010. Mark Schneider and Silke Pfeiffer. "A Fleeting Chance to End the War."
Rochlin, Jim. August 2010. "Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC." Review of International Studies. Vol. 37, No. 2. (Scholars Portal)
Sanín, Franscisco Gutiérrez, and Antonio Giustozzi. 2010. "Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 33. No. 9.
Semana.com Semana.com [Bogotá]. 29 January 2011. "La bolsa o la vida."
Time InternationalTime International. 10 November 2010. Tim Padgett and John Otis. "Can They Exhale?" Vol. 176, No. 15. (EBSCOhost)
United Nations (UN). 3 February 2011. Human Rights Council. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia. (A/HRC/16/22)
_____. 2010. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). World Drug Report 2010.
United States (US). 11 March 2010. "Colombia." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009.
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Academics from the University of Tromsø; the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University; the Sociology Department at Manhattan College; the Department of Political Science and Government at Universidad del Rosario; the Department of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes; the School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences at the University of Texas at Dallas; the Department of Political Science at the University of British Colombia; as well as the Director of Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (CNAI) did not reply within the time constraints of this Response. Academics from the Department of Economics at Universidad del Rosario, the University of Virginia's School of Law, and the Department of Sociology at Acadia University were unable to provide information for this Response.
Internet sites, including: Colombia - Fiscalía General de la Nación, Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (CNRR), Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), European Country of Origin Information Network (ecoi.net), Factiva, Fedesarrollo, GlobalSecurity.org, Human Rights Watch, Open Society Foundations, United Nations ReliefWeb.