Overview: In 2013, Tajikistan continued to address weaknesses in its counterterrorism strategy and demonstrated its ability to conduct counterterrorism operations. Tajikistan's counterterrorism policies were focused on marginalizing violent Islamist extremist groups in Tajikistani society. In 2013, Tajikistan conducted various meetings with its fellow Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to enhance cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism and border security. Tajikistan sought to increase military and law enforcement capacity to conduct tactical operations through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, including with the United States.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Tajikistani government prosecuted terrorists under the Law on Combating Terrorism, the Law on Anti-Money Laundering, the Law on Currency Regulation, the Law on Notary, and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. Resource constraints, corruption, lack of training for effective law enforcement and border security officials, and general capacity issues continued to plague the Tajikistani government's ability to interdict possible terrorists.

Throughout 2013, Tajikistan was an active participant in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and other U.S.-sponsored counterterrorism training programs. ATA focused on delivering training and equipment to build Tajikistani capacity to secure the country's borders. ATA assistance also included instructor development courses to improve the abilities of Tajikistani officers to share lessons from ATA training with their colleagues.

Tajikistan continued to make progress in improving border security with bilateral and multilateral assistance, although effectively policing the Tajikistani/Afghan border was a difficult task requiring more resources and capabilities than were available to the Tajikistani government. In 2013, the Tajikistani government established an interagency Secretariat, which met regularly throughout the year to coordinate implementation of Tajikistan's 2010 National Border Management Strategy. The International Organization for Migration and the OSCE worked to improve travel document security. The OSCE also provided funding to link Tajikistan's existing passport data scanners at airports and land ports of entry to the Interpol database. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Border Management Program in Central Asia, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime worked to improve border infrastructure, promote inter-agency cooperation, provide direct training, and expand training capacity in Tajikistan.

Corruption in the judicial system and misuse of counterterrorism statutes to suppress legitimate political opposition hampered the effectiveness of the government's counterterrorism efforts.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June 2011, Tajikistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. In October, the FAFT noted that Tajikistan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime but called on the country to address its remaining deficiencies: ensuring adequate procedures for freezing terrorist assets; implementing adequate procedures for the confiscation of funds related to the full range of money laundering predicate offences; and addressing the remaining issues relating to customer due diligence measures. The EAG has provided Tajikistan with assistance to improve its legislative and regulatory frameworks and operational capabilities.

In 2013, Tajikistan amended portions of its legislation pertaining to money laundering and financial crimes, bringing its laws closer to compliance with international recommendations

Outstanding deficiencies in the financial crime enforcement and regulatory sector included: lack of adequate record keeping; the lack of an effective financial intelligence unit; and poor coordination, staffing, and training among Tajikistani agencies that deal with money laundering, which impeded the Tajikistani government's ability to conduct effective investigations. Endemic corruption also hampered reforms in this area.

Tajikistan successfully prosecuted terrorists under the Law on Combating Terrorism in 2013. Three suspects faced anti-money laundering (AML) charges, and 28 faced charges related to countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), resulting in two AML- and 13 CFT-related convictions. In total, Tajikistan sentenced 45 members of prohibited organizations, 15 on finance-related charges. The Tajikistani government confiscated property in one AML and five CFT-related cases.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Tajikistan is an active member of the OSCE, where it focuses on border security issues, and is also a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (CSO). The United States, Russia, Japan, and the EU provided funding for border security programs in Tajikistan. In June 2013, Tajikistan participated in regional counterterrorism exercises with SCO partner nations.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Stemming violent extremism and radicalization in Tajikistan is a top priority for the Tajikistani government. Many of the government's measures, however, had a negative impact on religious freedoms, including prohibiting children under 18 from attending mosque or other public religious services and banning women from worshiping in mosques. We refer you to the Department of State's Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom for further information.

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