Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 - Peru

Overview: The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) remained a threat to Peru's internal security, although the terrorist organization was relatively quiet in 2014 in comparison to previous years. SL's membership numbers continued to dwindle, and it consisted of one single active faction by the end of 2014. Its area of activity and influence was confined to the special military emergency zone known as the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM), a remote and rugged region slightly larger than Switzerland which accounts for over half of the cocaine produced in Peru. SL sustained itself through its involvement in drug production, narcotics trafficking, and by extorting "revolutionary taxes" from others involved in the drug trade. It continued to use Maoist philosophy to justify its illegal activities.

SL was weakened as a consequence of an August 2013 operation conducted by Peruvian security forces that resulted in the deaths of two of the terrorist organization's top four commanders, Orlando Borda (Comrade Alipio) and Martin Quispe Palomino (Comrade Gabriel). In March, the then-chief of the VRAEM Special Command, Army General Leonardo Longa, claimed that the Shining Path only had around 100 armed fighters left in the emergency zone, concentrating more on criminal activities, primarily drug-related.

According to Peruvian government statistics, the SL committed 20 terrorist acts in 2014, in comparison to 49 terrorist acts recorded in 2013 and 87 acts in 2012. The SL's reduced activity and relatively low profile in comparison to previous years suggests that it has struggled to reconsolidate in the wake of the deaths of Alipio and Gabriel. Over the course of the year, the terrorist organization pursued a more selective strategy of "shoot-and-run" attacks. In 2014, SL attacks resulted in the deaths of two soldiers and the wounding of six soldiers, two police officers, and seven civilians. In 2013, three soldiers were killed in the VRAEM while 19 members of the security forces lost their lives in armed confrontations with the SL in 2012.

Security forces took limited actions to counter the SL during 2014, reflecting President Humala's strategy, announced in July 2013, of gaining control of territory in the VRAEM at the lowest cost in human lives. Security forces carried out various operations that freed at least 20 women and children held against their will by SL, as well as arresting or killing several SL members in the VRAEM's Junin Region.

SL founder and leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices remained in prison serving life sentences stemming from numerous crimes committed in the 1980s and 1990s.

On October 28 in Lima, Peruvian police arrested Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar, a 28-year old Lebanese national, for suspected links to Hizballah. According to reports, officers at the scene found residue and traces of military grade explosives in Hamdar's apartment, as well as TNT, gunpowder, and detonators in the outdoor trash can assigned to the unit. The National Police announced that Hamdar had confessed to being a member of Hizballah but Hamdar denied this on November 13, saying through a lawyer that the confession had been coerced. In November, a court ordered that Hamdar be detained for up to 18 months in pre-trial detention while prosecutors carry out an investigation and prepare charges.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Notable SL activity included:

• On February 17, a group of approximately 30 SL fighters attacked a camp that was housing workers expanding the Camisea gas pipeline in Cusco's Echarate district. The attack left one pipeline worker injured with a gunshot wound to the abdomen.

• On October 13, SL snipers opened fire on soldiers providing protection for a construction company working on a road in Ayacucho's Huanta province. One soldier was killed and four others were wounded.

• On October 28, a SL attack in the Junin province of Satipo left two soldiers wounded.

• On November 18, a SL sniper wounded a soldier in Cusco's Echarate district.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In the past three decades, Peru has passed a variety of laws specifically designed to combat terrorism. Despite high-level political will to counter terrorism, implementation and interagency coordination remained problematic. Communication gaps between senior-level policy planners and operators on the ground persisted, compounded by the high turnover rate among senior security leaders. In general, relations between the military and the Peruvian National Police were characterized by competition and mistrust. However, cooperation between the specialized counterterrorism police and military units improved.

The government remained hampered by excessive bureaucracy, resource constraints, corruption, and a lack of training. New recruits to the security forces were often sent to emergency zones with inadequate training and were poorly equipped to fight battles in a dense, jungle environment. Corruption was widespread within both the judiciary and security forces.

President Humala continued reauthorizing 60-day states of emergency in the VRAEM and the Upper Huallaga Valley emergency zones, giving the armed forces and police additional authority to maintain public order. The following civil liberties were suspended in emergency zones: freedom from search or arrest without warrant, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and inviolability of citizens' homes.

Peru steadily improved its ability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents in the 22 years since police captured the SL's founder and chief ideologue, Abimael Guzman. Improved cooperation and information sharing between specialized police and military counterterrorism units helped make possible the capture of Artemio in February 2012, and played a major role in the August 2013 military operation that resulted in the deaths of Alipio and Gabriel.

Immigration authorities collected no biometrics information from visitors. Citizens of neighboring countries were allowed to travel to Peru by land using only national identification cards. There was no visa requirement for citizens of most countries in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, as well as Mexico. Peruvian immigration used a database called "Movimiento Migratorio" at 18 points of entry to track entries and exits of travelers, but the database is only a local database that tracks outstanding warrants.

The most significant Peruvian government actions against SL this year included:

• On April 9, Peruvian police arrested 28 leaders of the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights – a front organization that advocates for the release of imprisoned SL founder Abimael Guzman. Those arrested included two of Guzman's long-time lawyers, Afredo Crespo and Manuel Fajardo. The 28 were charged with terrorism and terrorist financing using narcotics revenue. On August 4, the National Anti-Terrorism Court, citing lack of evidence, ordered that the 28 be released from pre-trail detention. Although the court ordered the detainees released, it did keep the charges intact so the trial can move forward.

• A May 16 clash between security forces and the SL in the Junin region left one SL guerilla dead and another wounded. The rest of the column was able to escape, but soldiers recovered weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment.

• On June 17, a combined Peruvian military and police force killed three SL terrorists in the VRAEM emergency zone. The joint patrol recovered a number of weapons, including a heavy machine gun that SL fighters reportedly stripped from a Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter they shot down in a 2009 attack that killed three soldiers.

• In August, security forces rescued six adults and three children from a work camp in the VRAEM used by SL to provide food and logistic support for its members.

• In August, police officers in the UHV arrested Oscar Silva, who is believed to have been the second-in-command to "Comrade Artemio," who was captured in February 2012.

• In September, soldiers rescued 11 people, including six children, who were being forced to work for SL in Junin's Satipo district.

• On November 2, security forces announced the arrest of Filemon Huillcayaure, considered one of the top financiers of SL in the VRAEM.

On October 28, 2014, Peruvian police arrested Muhammad Amadar, a suspected member of Hizballah, for allegedly plotting attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets.

Peru continued to participate in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided instruction and resources to assist the country in building its capacity to secure borders and ports of entry to prevent the transit of terrorist and material and to prevent the use of terrorist safe havens.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Peru is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Peru is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

In 2014, the Government of Peru made progress in implementing its National Plan to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The most notable advancement was the Public Ministry's creation of a dedicated Specialized Office of Prosecutors on Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture (ML/AF) in January. The Special Office is led by the National Superior Prosecutor and Coordinator for ML/AF, a new position empowered to facilitate interagency coordination and information sharing.

Under Decree Law 25475, any form of collaboration with terrorism, including economic collaboration, is criminalized. The Peruvian MFA registers non-profit organizations that receive international development assistance and monitors them for general misuse, but does not specifically monitor terrorist financing.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Government of Peru has publicly noted the importance of heavily investing in the VRAEM as a means of breaking the symbiotic relationship that has existed for years between the VRAEM's residents and SL. Since 2007, the Peruvian government has provided approximately US $5.4 billion to districts and regions in the VRAEM. The funds have been used to pave roads, provide basic health and education services, and establish a greater state presence. In May, the Agriculture Ministry announced that it would invest US $586 million in the VRAEM in 2014 in alternative crops to coca – primarily cacao, coffee, and oil palms. In December, the head of VRAEM Coordinating Office announced that the government would dedicate US $586 million on development projects in the VRAEM in 2015.

The official position of the Peruvian National Penitentiary Institute is that prison is meant to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, especially terrorists. A psychological evaluation is required of incarcerated terrorists before parole can be granted.