Note: Covers the period June 2012 to May 2014.

Executive Summary

Since the end of communism, democracy and human rights have become key values in Poland's foreign policy. Although restrained by its capacity as a mid-sized economy, Poland has at times played a leadership role in providing support and condemning abuses. Poland's democracy and human rights promotion focuses on the former Soviet republics, especially Belarus, as well as multilateral efforts through the European Union.

Poland's main activities in this area are election observation and assistance for free expression and free association in its neighbors to the east. Official statements regularly express concern at electoral fraud and other abuses. A vocal critic of Russia's interference in Ukraine in 2014 and a strong proponent of punitive action, Poland lobbied its allies for similar defense of democratic principles. Poland's support for the rights of marginalized populations in other countries generally aligns with the interests of its domestic constituents.

Introduction

Twenty-five years have passed since communism was overthrown and Poland made the transition to democracy. During this period, key actors from Poland's struggle to overthrow communism have become involved in efforts to build democratic political systems and independent civil societies in countries in Eastern Europe and beyond. Poland's successful domestic transition has served as a powerful context for its democracy and human rights support abroad.

Another important factor has been Poland's entrance into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Poland's integration into key European institutions has enhanced economic and social development and ensured security, which in turn have facilitated Poland's active participation in organizations such as the European Endowment for Democracy (of which Poland was a cofounder at the beginning of 2013). Warsaw also became the host to major human rights organizations such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the secretariat of the Community of Democracies. Poland played a significant role in the creation of the latter, and has demonstrated sustained commitment to its goal of supporting democracy.

For historical and security reasons, Poland focuses its foreign policy on its neighbors. This includes the former Soviet republics, which have the largest democracy and human rights deficits in the region. Poland also has interests in other parts of the world, some of which it does not address as fully as it might.

Poland's support for democracy and human rights has been restrained by its capacity. In 1995, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 43 percent of the EU average, moving to just 64 percent in 2011. Thus, the Polish economy continues to lag behind the West. Despite high GDP growth since 2003, Polish politicians – and Polish society – appear convinced that an expansion of its current level of democracy support is not possible at this time.

Nevertheless, while Poland could do more to advance democracy and human rights beyond its borders, it has become a respected voice on the world stage.

Foreign Policy Objectives

As in any country, democracy support plays a secondary role to strategic priorities in Poland's foreign policy. In the case of its closest neighbors, however, Poland's support for democracy can be quite significant. In Belarus, Poland plays a greater role in pressing for democratic change than any other country. Meanwhile, although Polish politicians frequently invoke terms such as "democracy" and "human rights," there is no agreement on what these words mean (Poland has no stated definitions in its foreign policy) or how they should be achieved.

The minister of foreign affairs presents Poland's foreign policy priorities annually at a meeting of the lower house of parliament (the Sejm). In May 2014, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski emphasized that "Poland's priorities when it comes to expert assistance will continue to be: the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, fighting corruption, cooperation of border services, energy coordination, and support for the development of rural regions."[1]

In March 2013, Sikorski announced that support for the development of civil society in Eastern Europe was a leading priority, with Belarus as a key recipient of assistance. He also identified the Arab world as a target area for democracy promotion. Sikorski added, "We are glad that we were successful in our efforts to establish the [European Endowment for Democracy], and that a Polish candidate – Jerzy Pomianowski – was chosen as its first director. The Endowment will promote democracy in the entire EU neighborhood."[2] On China, the minister said only that "we are ready to share our experiences should China one day opt for a system of political pluralism."

Although the priorities for the promotion of democracy remained similar in the 2014 address, the minister gave special attention to Ukraine. He also referred to changes in other countries: "Today a number of countries, including Egypt, Myanmar, and Tunisia, look up to us as a model of transition from a totalitarian regime to a free-market democracy." In contrast, civil rights and liberties were not mentioned in relation to China in 2014.[3] Thus, democracy is a priority for Poland, but the area of focus consists of the former Soviet republics and other countries in the region.

Development Assistance and Trade

The promotion of democracy has been integrated into Poland's development aid since 2012. According to the "Long-term development cooperation program for 2012-2015,"[4] there are only two thematic areas of Polish development cooperation: system transformation, and democracy and human rights. A program for 2012 to 2015 presents the general principles of Polish aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts planning and coordination of the democratization agenda, while its implementation is carried out by other ministries, embassies (for small grants), the state aid agency (Solidarity Fund PL, formerly the Polish Know How Foundation for International Development Cooperation), and civil society organizations.

Poland is not at the forefront of development assistance, and indeed was an aid recipient until recently. The Center for Global Development's Commitment to Development Index put Poland in last place out of 27 rich countries in 2013 in terms of quantity and quality of aid to poor countries. The Polish government also gives the lowest net volume of aid as a share of GDP among those countries included in the index (0.08 percent).[6] According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, Poland spent $421.06 million on development assistance in 2012, and $417.5 million in 2011.

A portion of official aid figures includes cancellation of other countries' debt as well as credits granted on preferential terms, which are not related to democracy support. The remaining money is distributed by other ministries, with an intention to promote human rights and democracy. A large portion of the funds goes to the EU for joint projects, over which Poland has little influence. In 2013, the foreign ministry planned to give €72 million ($94 million) to the European Development Fund, and in 2014 the figure was €87.5 million ($114.5 million).[7]

The reason for low aid figures appears to be a lack of public interest in development assistance. Although the standard of living of the Polish population is still lower than among its Western neighbors, in 2013 Poland became a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which brings together donor countries.

The foreign ministry and Solidarity Fund PL have organized competitions for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) aimed at promoting development assistance and supporting democracy. In 2014, the ministry gave grants aimed at democratization, system transformation, education, and to a lesser extent humanitarian aid for the following: 6 projects targeting Belarus, 10 for Georgia, 8 for Moldova, 16 for Ukraine, 9 for East Africa, 5 for Central Asia, and 2 for the Palestinian Authority. The total sum was rather small, at $8.7 million. The recipients of grants were varied, and the projects were related to the promotion of democracy, local communities, and marginalized groups. Members of the EU's Eastern Partnership[8] – mainly Belarus and Ukraine – received more than half of the funds, of which 70 percent was aimed at democratization and transformation. East Africa, North Africa, and Central Asia received 40 percent of Poland's development aid. Other major recipients were Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinian Authority. In 2014, Solidarity Fund PL initiated projects aimed at the former Soviet republics as well as Tunisia ($1.4 million in total).[9]

Human rights and democracy play a minor role in Poland's trade policies. However, Poland has supported the limited economic sanctions imposed on Belarus in recent years. Furthermore, in 2014 Warsaw strongly supported the imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion of Crimea and the de facto military deployment in the east of Ukraine, both for security reasons and in defense of democracy. Minister Sikorski said, "These sanctions should convince President Putin that the West as a community of values does exist, and is able to unite when the elementary principles of international law are violated."[10]

Elections

Polish politicians have emphasized repeatedly that democracy in neighboring countries is in Poland's national interest. Hence, Poland pays close attention to elections in those countries where democracy is severely repressed – as in the case of Belarus – or where it is fragile, as in Ukraine.

Poland's principal democracy agency (formerly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now Solidarity Fund PL) regularly sends large numbers of observers to monitor elections in Belarus, most recently for the House of Representatives elections in September 2012. After the elections, the Polish foreign ministry stated that it was "deeply disappointed" that the elections fell well short of international standards. The ministry also expressed concern over the detention of human rights defenders, political opponents, and journalists during the campaign period.[11]

Poland did not acknowledge the results of these elections (nor did the European Parliament). As a result, there is no possibility of cooperation between the Polish Sejm and the Belarusian House of Representatives. Poland also supported the exclusion of Belarusian parliamentarians from Euronest, which brings together members of the European Parliament with representatives of parliaments from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries to promote political association and economic integration.[12]

In the October 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Poland sent 212 representatives, the largest group of observers in the country.[13] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was restrained in its response to the findings: "The Foreign Ministry [ ... ] notes that during the elections many infringements took place, relating, among other things, to the use of administrative pressure, lack of transparency with regard to the financing of political parties, and the restriction of media access for opposition and independent candidates. Thus, the electoral process was not fully consistent with democratic standards."[14] Despite the concerns, Poland endorsed the results.

For the high-profile Ukrainian presidential election in May 2014, Poland sent more than 100 observers. This time the vote was judged more positively. The foreign ministry stated that "Poland looks on the organization of the presidential elections in Ukraine with satisfaction."[15] Other Polish officials took a similar position.

Large numbers of observers were sent to the October 2012 parliamentary elections and the October 2013 presidential elections in Georgia, which were assessed favorably.[16] Having limited personal and financial capabilities, Poland has sent smaller numbers of observers to other countries. In these cases, the positions held by international organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, or the EU have guided Polish authorities in their assessments. Sometimes Polish authorities are silent, even in the face of election law violations in Eastern Partnership countries. For example, Poland did not criticize fraudulent elections in 2013 in Azerbaijan. Nor did Poland call for the release of Anar Mammadli, president of the Azerbaijan-based Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), after a Baku court sentenced him to five and a half years' imprisonment; this lack of response provoked criticism from Polish human rights organizations.[17]

Disruptions of Democratic Processes

The events in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 were regarded as important in Poland. As the opposition protestors survived brutal attempts to disperse them, leading Polish politicians, as well as Polish society generally, supported the protest movement. At first, official Polish statements were careful to avoid the appearance of interfering in the affairs of a foreign state. As events continued, however, the Polish government has been intensively engaged with the Ukrainian crisis.

During the violent clashes in Kiev in February 2014, Polish president Bronislaw Komorowski met with Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and called for the immediate cessation of the use of force and a return to negotiations with the opposition.[18] Polish foreign minister Sikorski took on mediation efforts, with the participation of the foreign ministries of France and Germany.

After Yanukovych fled to Russia at the end of February and an interim government was established in Ukraine, the Polish leadership assured Kiev of its support. Komorowski indicated that Poland might share with Ukraine its positive experience of building a system to combat corruption, reform local government, and support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises.[19] Poland was also a key player in forging the EU consensus for active engagement in Ukraine and the eventual signing of the Association Agreement (which had been the original impetus for the demonstrations).

Warsaw has taken a critical view of Russia's occupation of Crimea. Sikorski has emphasized that Russia is violating the rules of international coexistence and exporting terrorism, and that Poland condemns the annexation of the peninsula.[20] Authorities in Warsaw did not recognize the March 2014 referendum in Crimea that led to the formal attachment of the peninsula to Russia.

Warsaw has also adopted a negative stance toward Russian interference in eastern Ukraine, not recognizing the referendums on the creation of the so-called People's Republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, Poland supported Ukraine's presidential election held on May 25. Recognizing that the demonstrations had driven out an elected government, Komorowski said on May 23, "The elections will give legitimacy to the new authorities and bring stability."[21]

Beyond Ukraine, the authorities in Warsaw have tended to react cautiously to disruptions of democratic processes. While Polish media and human rights organizations have criticized the ruling party's tightening of control in Hungary, Polish authorities have not. "I'll be at the disposal of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, if I could come in handy where opinions on Hungary are exaggerated or unfair. And I feel that part of the reaction is exaggerated,"[22] concluded Prime Minister Donald Tusk in 2012. A stronger official statement was made in response to Hungarian prime minister Orbán's reluctance in March 2014 to support Ukraine (he demanded autonomy for ethnic Hungarians there): Prime Minister Tusk declared Hungary's hesitation "unfortunate" and de facto support for pro-Russian separatists.[23]

Poland reacts in an especially careful manner to cases outside its region. After the coup in Thailand, the foreign ministry statement on May 22, 2014, declared that "Poland is concerned about the development of the conflict in Thailand and the seizure of power by the military. Invariably, we stand on the side of democracy, rule of law, and civil liberties."[24] They adopted much the same position after the coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2012. In most cases, Poland's stance is similar to those presented by the EU and other international organizations.

Gross Human Rights Violations

Poland promotes respect for fundamental human rights according to its capabilities, mainly through its presence in international organizations that address these matters. Poland is an active member of the Council of Europe, and representative Wojciech Sawicki is the secretary general of the Parliamentary Assembly. Poland was elected to the UN Human Rights Council for the years 2010 to 2016; in 2013, Polish representative Remigiusz Henczel headed this body. Other organizations in which Poland participates include the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

The Polish stance on the fighting in Syria has been generally analogous to that presented by the EU, whose member states largely recognized the Syrian opposition as the representative of the Syrian people in November 2012. However, in July 2012, Poland was one of the last states to close its embassy in Syria. The embassy remains closed today for security reasons, but the Syrian embassy in Warsaw is functioning normally. Thus, Poland has not taken a strong stance against the Assad regime.

In August 2013, after receiving information about the use of chemical weapons by Syrian government forces, Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that Poland would not participate in any intervention in Syria: "We have experience in this part of the world, which shows that military intervention, even from the most obvious and noble motives, rarely produces the desired effect."[25] According to media reports, it was Foreign Minister Sikorski who initiated the solution to the problem of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal without the use of force, a strategy that was later adopted by the United States and Russia.[26]

When bloody clashes between government forces and demonstrators occurred in Turkey in May and June 2013, Polish authorities avoided taking a position on the events. The Polish foreign ministry issued a warning for tourists, assuring them that Turkish coastal resorts were still safe. Poland has responded similarly to events in other countries, alerting tourists about expected riots in 2012 in Venezuela and Egypt.

In contrast, in South Sudan, Poland has provided assistance to victims, particularly through NGOs such as the Polish Humanitarian Organisation. Poland was also engaged in the EU peacekeeping mission (EUFOR RCA) in the Central African Republic. As emphasized by representatives of the Polish authorities, participation in this mission was in part related to improving relations with France, which led the operation. According to a Polish defense ministry official, that mission "reinforces the Polish image as a reliable and important partner committed to building a secure international environment."[27]

Civil Liberties

Polish authorities recognize the problems surrounding freedom of association, assembly, and expression in other countries, but not always consistently. Poland's most constant support is for human rights forces in Belarus. Many independent or opposition Belarusian centers exist in Poland, acting with the support of the Polish authorities. The most important are Belarusian House in Warsaw, the Internet portal Charter97, and the Solidarity with Belarus Information Office.

However, the most significant achievement of Polish assistance has been the creation and support of Belsat TV. The channel was established under an agreement signed by the Polish foreign ministry and Polish Television (TVP SA) in 2007; today, Belsat continues to be funded by both.[28] Belsat is the only independent Belarusian television channel, with programming created by Belarusians. Based in Warsaw, the channel is transmitted by satellite and over the Internet. According to research conducted in April 2014, its audience includes 7 percent of the adult population of Belarus.[29] Belsat's impact is limited, however, as most Belarusians watch TV from Russia.[30]

In addition, two radio stations broadcast to Belarus from Polish territory. The audience for the Belarusian channel, Radio Ratsya, was estimated at 1.5 million people in 2013, but due to the closed environment in Belarus it is difficult to determine the actual number of listeners. The second is the European Radio for Belarus, whose programs are broadcast on Polish Radio, as well as private radio in Ukraine and Lithuania. In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated $1.2 million to these radio stations,[31] although the current impact of these stations is not significant.

To a much lesser extent, Poland supports the media in Ukraine. Various NGOs, using Polish government money, organize trainings for Ukrainian journalists. Polish NGOs also actively support civil society in Ukraine.

Poland maintains a cautious stance on human rights in China. In mid-2013, controversy and criticism, especially from human rights organizations and the media, was triggered by a delegation from the Polish parliament to Beijing on the anniversary of the massacre in Tiananmen Square. In defending the decision, Speaker of the Sejm Ewa Kopacz said that she would discuss human rights during a meeting with the chairman of the National People's Congress of China on the anniversary of the violence.[32] Separately, in June 2013, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski met with Chinese bloggers known for their criticism of the authorities.[33]

In March 2014, while visiting Iran, Sikorski criticized censorship and restrictions on freedom of the media. As a result, his speech was censored in Iranian state media.[34]

Marginalized Communities

With respect to marginalized communities, Poland is primarily interested in challenges faced by ethnic Poles in Belarus and Lithuania. Belarusian official data shows 294,000 ethnic Poles living in the country. In 2005, Belarusian authorities canceled democratic elections in the biggest Polish organization, the Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB), and created their own union with an obedient leadership. As a result, ZPB still has two leadership factions. The democratically elected but illegal leadership is to some extent tolerated, though its members are often discriminated against and persecuted. However, opportunities for diplomatic intervention are limited. Poland primarily supports ZPB financially, including helping with the issuance of its publications.

There are 213,000 ethnic Poles in Lithuania, representing up to 80 percent of the population in some regions. Poland has repeatedly intervened in cases such as when Poles are not allowed to write their names in their own language, or when the Polish language cannot be used on road signs. "I hope that in the end there will be a majority in the Lithuanian parliament which will respect the obvious rights of minorities," said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in February 2014.[35]

Other support for marginalized communities includes the MFA-initiated Lech Walesa Solidarity Prize, which was awarded to Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev in May 2014.

In Muslim countries, Poland has advocated for the rights of Christians. In March 2013, Minister Sikorski said, "Poland is one of those countries that is not afraid to say that Christians are the most persecuted religion today in the world. We will defend the rights of Christians as much as we can."[36] In October 2013, the Sejm called for "bold action in defense of Christians in Syria and Egypt." Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski supported the resolution, although no strong action was taken.[37]

Poland has not taken a position in other cases of persecution of marginalized groups. One example is abuses against the LGBT community in Russia, for which Poland has had no response.

About the Author: Piotr Kościński is Eastern and South Eastern Europe programme coordinator at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.


1 Radoslaw Sikorski, "Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Foreign Policy in 2014," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, May 8, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/address_by_the_minister_of_foreign_affairs_on_the_goals_of_polish_foreign_policy_in_2014.

2 Radoslaw Sikorski, "Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Goals of Polish Foreign Policy in 2013," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, March 20, 2013, http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/address_by_the_minister_of_foreign_affairs_on_the_goals_of_polish_foreign_policy_in2013_?printMode=true.

3 Sikorski, May 8, 2014.

4 "Wieloletni Program Współpracy Rozwojowej: Na Lata 2012-2015" ("Long-term Development Cooperation Program for 2012-2015"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, adopted by the government on March 20, 2012, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/inne%20dokumenty%20PDF/Pomoc%20zagraniczna%202011/PWieloletni.pdf.

5 "Plan współpracy rozwojowej w 2014 r" ("Development Cooperation Plan for 2014"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, 2013, https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/b606b336-cd52-47f6-9344-ad092f0403e7:JCR.

6 "The Commitment to Development Index," Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index.

7 "Plan współpracy rozwojowej w 2014 r" ("Development Cooperation Plan for 2014"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, 2014, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/Dokumenty_i_Publikacje/Plan_wspolpracy_2014/Plan%20wspolpracy%20rozwjowowej%202%20modyfikacja2014.pdf.

8 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine.

9 "MSZ rozstrzygnęło konkurs "Polska pomoc rozwojowa 2014'" ("Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided on 'Polish Development Assistance in 2014' contest"), Polska Pomoc, January 30, 2014, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/MSZ,rozstrzygnelo,konkurs,Polska,pomoc,rozwojowa,2014,1969.html.

10 Rozmawiała Renata Grochal, "Minister Radosław Sikorski: Te sankcje powinny już dać kierownictwu Rosji do myślenia" ("Minister Radoslaw Sikorski: These Sanctions Should Already Make the Leadership of Russia Think"), Gazeta Wyborcza, July 29, 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,16398508,Minister_Radoslaw_Sikorski__Te_sankcje_powinny_juz.html.

11 "Polskie MSZ rozczarowane standardami wyborów na Białorusi" ("Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs disappointed by election standards in Belarus"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, September 24, 2012, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/msz_w_mediach/polskie_msz_rozczarowane_standardami_wyborow_na_bialorusi__depesza_pap_24_09_2012_?printMode=true.

12 Interview with Robert Tyszkiewicz, member of Parliament, deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

13 "Офіційні спостерігачі від іноземних держав та міжнародних організацій" ("Official Observers from Foreign States and International Organizations"), Central Election Commission of Ukraine, October 28, 2012, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp041?PT001F01=900.

14 "Oświadczenie MSZ w sprawie wyborów na Ukrainie" ("Statement of the MFA on the Elections in Ukraine"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, October 29, 2012, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/oswiadczenie_msz_w_sprawie_wyborow_na_ukrainie.

15 "Oświadczenie MSZ po wyborach prezydenckich na Ukrainie" ("Statement by the Foreign Ministry after the Presidential Elections in Ukraine"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, May 26, 2014, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/oswiadczenie_msz_po_wyborach_prezydenckich_na_ukrainie.

16 "MSZ ws. wyborów parlamentarnych w Gruzji" ("MFA on Parliamentary Elections in Georgia"), October 3, 2012, http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/msz-ws-wyborow-parlamentarnych-w-gruzji-komunikat; Krzysztof Nieczypor, "Szefowie dyplomacji Polski i Szwecji chwalą kampanię wyborczą w Gruzji" ("Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers Praise the Campaign in Georgia"), EastBook.eu, October 23, 2013, http://eastbook.eu/2013/10/country/georgia/szefowie-dyplomacji-polski-i-szwecji-chwal%C4%85-kampani%C4%99-wyborcz%C4%85-w-gruzji-wideo/.

17 Krzysztof Bobiński and Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, "Polska powinna upomnieć się o Mammadlego" ("Poland Should Stand up for Mammadli"), Gazeta Wyborcza, January 21, 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,15306068,Polska_powinna_upomniec_sie_o_Mammadlego.html.

18 "Apel do prezydenta Ukrainy o natychmiastowe wstrzymanie użycia siły" ("Appeal to the President of Ukraine to Immediately Stop the Use of Force"), Official Website of the President of the Republic of Poland, February 19, 2014, http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,2810,apel-do-prezydenta-ukrainy-o-natychmiastowe-wstrzymanie-uzycia-sily.html.

19 "President and National Security Council Discuss Ukrainian Crisis' Impact," Official Website of the President of the Republic of Poland, February 26, 2014, http://www.president.pl/en/news/news/art,569,president-and-national-security-council-discuss-ukrainian-crisis-impact.html.

20 "Sikorski: Rosja eksportuje terroryzm. Ale będziemy z nią rozmawiać" ("Sikorski: Russia Exports Terrorism. But We'll Talk to Her"), Rzeczpospolita, June 6, 2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1115852.html.

21 "President Hopes for Stability in Ukraine after Elections," Official Website of the President of the Republic of Poland, May 23, 2014, http://www.president.pl/en/news/news/art,624,president-hopes-for-stability-in-ukraine-after-elections.html.

22 "'Przywódcy Polski i Litwy podjęli obronę Węgier. Dziękujemy'" ("'The Polish and Lithuanian Leaders Defended Hungary. Thank You.'"), Gazeta Wiadomości, February 13, 2012, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,11138134,_Przywodcy_Polski_i_Litwy_podjeli_obrone_Wegier__Dziekujemy__.html.

23 "Tusk ostro o Orbanie. 'To niefortunna wypowiedź'" ("Tusk Sharp on Orban. 'This Is an Unfortunate Statement'"), Polskie Radio, May 13, 2014, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1123532,Tusk-ostro-o-Orbanie-To-niefortunna-wypowiedz.

24 "Zamach stanu w Tajlandii, władzę przejęła armia" ("Coup in Thailand, Army Seized Power"), RMF 24, May 22, 2014, http://m.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news,nId,1430125.

25 "Poland Will Not Join Strikes on Syria," Polskie Radio, August 28, 2013, http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/145573,Poland-will-not-join-strikes-on-Syria.

26 Matthew Day and Damien McElroy, "Syria: Polish Foreign Minister Takes Credit for Chemical Weapons Plan," The Telegraph, September 11, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10301640/Syria-Polish-foreign-minister-takes-credit-for-chemical-weapons-plan.html.

27 "Wylot na afrykańską misję" ("Depart on African Mission"), Altair, January 30, 2014, http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=12599.

28 "About Us," Belsat TV, http://belsat.eu/en/o_nas/.

29 Interview with Agnieszka Romaszewska, director, Belsat TV.

30 Interview with Valery Karbalevich, independent Belarussian political scientist.

31 "What is Euroradio?" Euroradio FM, http://euroradio.fm/en/node/3975.

32 Tomasz Sajewicz, "Kopacz w Chinach: Wspomnę o prawach człowieka" ("Kopacz in China: the Mention of Human Rights"), Gazeta Wyborcza, June 5, 2013, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,14038458,Kopacz_w_Chinach__Wspomne_o_prawach_czlowieka.html.

33 "Minister Sikorski i blogerzy o nowych mediach w społeczeństwie chińskim" ("Minister Sikorski and New Media Bloggers in China"), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, June 13, 2013, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_sikorski_i_blogerzy_o_nowych_mediach_w_spoleczenstwie_chinskim.

34 "Sikorski mówił o cenzurze, to go... ocenzurowali. W Iranie" ("Sikorski Spoke of Censorship, Is It... Censored in Iran"), Gazeta Wiadomości, March 7, 2014, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,15582705,Sikorski_mowil_o_cenzurze__to_go____ocenzurowali_.html.

35 "Donald Tusk o sytuacji polskiej mniejszości na Litwie: chcemy takich standardów, aby prawa mniejszości były podobne jak w Polsce" ("Donald Tusk on the Situation of the Polish Minority in Lithuania: We Want the Standards for Minority Rights to Be Similar to Those in Poland"), Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, February 18, 2014, https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/donald-tusk-o-sytuacji-polskiej-mniejszosci-na-litwie-chcemy-takich.html.

36 "Sikorski: Chrześcijanie są prześladowani, a Polska będzie ich bronić. Ale władza musi być świecka" ("Sikorski: Christians Are Persecuted, and Poland Will Defend Them. But the Government Must Be Secular"), Interia.pl, March 20, 2013, http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/news-sikorski-chrzescijanie-sa-przesladowani-a-polska-bedzie-ich-,nId,944734.

37 "Sejm wzywa do działań w obronie chrześcijan w Syrii i Egipcie" ("Parliament Calls for Action in Defense of the Christians in Syria and Egypt"), Wiadomości, October 11, 2013, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/sejm-wzywa-do-dzialan-w-obronie-chrzescijan-w-syrii-i-egipcie/jj3s3.

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