Overview: In 2013, Singapore's bilateral engagement on counterterrorism law enforcement and intelligence cooperation benefited from improved working level dialogue on many of the issues that had previously impeded the development of more strategic and productive agency-to-agency relationships. Of note, Singapore and U.S. law enforcement agencies worked closely to share information on known or suspected terrorists.

As of December 2013, terrorist suspects detained in Singapore included members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), who have plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Two persons with links to terrorist groups were newly detained in 2013, including a self-radicalized Singaporean who intended to join the Muslim insurgency in south Thailand and the son of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari. In addition, the October 2012 detention of one person, a self-radicalized individual, was announced in March 2013. In 2013, Singapore placed four persons on Restriction Orders (RO) and the ROs of two additional persons were allowed to lapse. Detainees placed on ROs are monitored by Singaporean authorities and required to report to authorities on a regular basis.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists without trial. The ISA authorizes the Minister for Home Affairs (MHA), with the consent of the president, to order detention without judicial review if it is determined that a person poses a threat to national security. The initial detention may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the detention for an unlimited number of additional periods up to two years at a time with the president's consent.

Singapore's law enforcement demonstrated the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The Internal Security Department (ISD) provides threat assessments and carries out field investigations of suspected terrorist-related activities or incidents. Law enforcement units displayed coordination, command, and control in responding to threat information affecting Singapore's security. Singapore's law enforcement actions included:

  • In March, Asyrani bin Hussaini was detained for two years under the ISA for attempting to participate in the armed insurgency in south Thailand. He entered south Thailand illegally to join Thai insurgents.

  • Abdul Majid, a member of the militant group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who was detained under the ISA in June 2011, was placed on RO in June 2013. He had undergone military training at the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao, and helped the MILF procure funds and weapon components. He cooperated in the investigation and showed significant progress in his rehabilitation. He was assessed to no longer pose a security threat that required preventive detention.

  • In September, Singaporean Mustafa Kamal bin Mohammad was placed on Restriction Order for two years. Mustafa was a member of MILF in the Philippines and had undergone military training at the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar and raised funds for it.

  • Jahpar bin Osman and Samad bin Subari, both JI members detained under the ISA in April 2005 and July 2011, respectively, were placed on RO in April 2013 and July 2013, respectively.

  • The Restriction Orders against two JI members, Arifin bin Ali and Mohammad Sharif bin Rahmat, and MILF member Ahmad Jalaluddin bin Sanawi, were allowed to lapse between May and August. They had been cooperative and responsive to rehabilitation efforts and no longer required supervision.

  • Muhammad Hanif Mas Selamat, son of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari was deported to Singapore from Indonesia on October 30. He remained under investigation for activities "inimical to the security of Singapore."

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Singapore is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. The country's secrecy protections, lack of routine large currency reporting requirements, the large scale of its private banking sector and relatively large casino sector pose significant risks for exploitation by illicit actors. There were no assets frozen or confiscated for terrorist finance-related crimes. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Singapore was an active participant in ASEAN and is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Singapore maintains a de-radicalization program that focuses on countering detainees' violent extremist ideology. Singapore enlists the support of religious teachers and scholars to study JI's ideology, develops teachings to counter the group's spread within Singapore's Muslim community, and provides counseling to detainees. Religious counseling for detainees continues after release. There were no reported cases of recidivism among the individuals released from detention or restrictive order.

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