Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 - Eritrea

Overview: In 2014, the Government of Eritrea continued to claim that it sought to be a partner in the war on terrorism. Eritrean officials in Asmara, at the UN, and at the AU, issued statements and told Embassy staff that Eritrea wanted to move out of a long period of regional isolation and animosity. Eritrean officials engaged in shuttle diplomacy with nations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to discuss regional stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and regional initiatives to counter transnational challenges, especially migration and human trafficking. The UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) continued to accuse Eritrea of sponsoring regional armed groups. The Eritrean government denied the accusations and continued to levy charges that Ethiopia supported groups committed to the violent overthrow of the Eritrean regime. Eritrea's poor relations with Ethiopia, Djibouti, the United States, and the SEMG limited opportunities for cooperation or counterterrorism dialogue.

In May, the United States re-certified Eritrea as "not cooperating fully" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In considering this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed Eritrea's overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.

The Government of Eritrea has been under UNSC sanctions since December 2009 as a result of past evidence of support for terrorism and regional destabilization. UNSCR 1907 (2009) imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political leaders, calling on the nation to "cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region." The SEMG's October report found no evidence that Eritrea is supporting al-Shabaab or opposition groups in South Sudan.

Lack of transparency on how governing structures function means that we do not have a clear picture of the methods the Eritrean government uses to track terrorists or maintain safeguards for its citizens. For a number of years, members of the police have refused to meet with security officials from western nations to discuss policy matters, although the U.S. government had informal contact with law enforcement counterparts in 2014.

The Government of Eritrea remained prone to labeling any persons who advocate change or political reform, or who appear to oppose the Eritrean President, as terrorists.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Articles 259-264, 269-270, and 282 of the Eritrean Penal Code, grandfathered into present-day law from 1957, criminalize terrorist methods; measures of intimidation or terrorism; acts of conspiracy carried out by organized armed bands; offenses that make use of arms, means, or support from foreign organizations; use of bombs, dynamite, explosives, or other terrorist methods constituting a public danger; genocide; and war crimes against the civilian population. Other sections of Eritrean law could also be used to prosecute terrorism, including acts related to offenses against public safety; offenses against property; offenses against the state; offenses against the national interest; offenses against international interests; attacks on the independence of the state; impairment of the defensive power of the state; high treason; economic treason; collaboration; and provocation and preparation.

Entities including the Eritrean Defense Forces, National Security Agency (NSA), Police, Immigration and Customs authorities all potentially have counterterrorism responsibilities. There are special units of the NSA that monitor fundamentalism or extremism. Chain of command may work effectively within some security and law-enforcement elements, but there are rivalries and responsibilities that overlap between and among the various forces. Whether information sharing occurs depends on personal relationships between and among given unit commanders. Many soldiers, police officers and immigration and customs agents are young national service recruits or assignees, performing their jobs without adequate training.

The Government of Eritrea, justifying its behavior based on alleged threats from Ethiopia, continued to reject the need to prioritize adherence to international human rights standards, and instead based many of its law enforcement decisions and practices on statutes resembling martial law.

The Eritrean government closely monitors passenger manifests for any flights coming into Asmara, and scrutinizes travel documents of visitors, but does not collect biometric data. Government officials lack training and technology to recognize fraudulent documents. The Government of Eritrea does not share information gathered at ports of entry with the United States.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Eritrea is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. This gap prevents any overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist financing. Eritrea's general lack of transparency on banking, financial, and economic matters makes the gathering of definitive information difficult. On September 8, the Government of Eritrea issued Proclamation No. 175/2014 on "Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism," which criminalized terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Eritrea is a member of the AU, and would like to reactivate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority (IGAD); however, Eritrea's return to IGAD is opposed by both Ethiopia and Djibouti, both of whom have had military conflicts and have unresolved border disputes with Eritrea.